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W.: Negligence--Liability of Automobile Driver Injuring Others After

ABSTRACTS
commissioner to whom the cause was referred found for D on the
basis that W's leaving D was unjustified. The trial chancellor
entered a decree affirming the findings of the commissioner, which
decree is appealed. Held, that the commissioner's and the trial
chancellor's findings of fact that W deserted D without justification
and that W was sane at the time she did so are warranted by the
evidence and are not clearly wrong or against the preponderance
of the evidence, and therefore, the decree of the trial chancellor is
affirmed. Snyder v. Lane, 89 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1955).
In an earlier consideration of this case on the pleadings only,
the court held that insanity of the deserted party cannot be asserted
by the wrongdoer as a ground for demurrer to a bill of complaint by
a committee on behalf of the wronged party for separate maintenance on the ground that the commissioner is not a proper party.
Snyder v. Lane, 135 W. Va. 887, 65 S.E.2d 483 (1951).
The principal case is noteworthy since few cases have passed
on the effect of insanity on the necessary intent to abandon in the
case of desertion. The principal case shows clearly that in a suit
for separate maintenance, based on W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 29
(Michie 1955), a showing that the plaintiff was the deserter and
was sane at the time of the abandonment is a sufficient defense,
even though the plaintiff may later become insane. In Fisher v.
Fisher,54 W. Va. 146, 46 S.E. 118 (1903), the court held that insanity of the defendant after the passage of the requisite desertion
period was no defense to a bill of complaint for a divorce. As has
been pointed out, the Fisher case clearly intimates that, had the
insanity occurred before the passage of the requisite desertion period, the insanity would be a defense, because of the impossibility
of entertaining the requisite intent. Colson, West Virginia Divorce
Law, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 203, 208 (1937). In the principal case, the
court indicates that if the plaintiff had been insane at the time of
the separation, the fact that the plaintiff left the defendant would
have been no defense, for the plaintiff in such case could not have
the requisite intent to abandon.
H. R. A., Jr.

NEGIxGENCE-LkARB

Y OF AUTOMOBILE DRIvrm INJURING OTHERS

AFTER SUDDEN PHYsICAL OR MENTAL INCAPACITATION.-X, driving his
automobile, suddenly lost control thereof, and the automobile ran
onto a sidewalk and hit P. At the time of the accident, or within
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seconds afterwards, X was unconscious, and he died of a massive
cerebral hemorrhage before reaching the hospital. In an action
brought by P against X's estate, testimony indicated that X had
appeared in normal and good spirits minutes before the accident.
However, there was conflicting testimony as to X's prior medical
history. The issue of whether operation of an automobile by X,
in view of his physical condition and background, was sufficient
to constitute negligence was one of first impression in West Virginia.
P offered only one witness whose testimony would be indicative that X could have foreseen or anticipated that he would have
a sudden attack. This witness, a medical doctor, stated that in
1944 [eleven years prior to the accident] he told X "that he was
seriously ill, that the findings [of a heart condition] were of a progressive nature, and he could shorten his life by excessive physical
activity; he should limit himself entirely to a more or less sedentary
life, should not participate in any unnecessary physical exertion,
including driving an automobile". The court said, "A careful analysis of the statement,... shows that [X] was not informed that if he
operated an automobile he might have a sudden attack of some
kind which would result in serious consequences to himself or
others". The court then noted that P did not offer any evidence to
show that X, prior to the date of the accident, had had a stroke,
fainting spell, or any other type of attack rendering him dizzy or
unconscious.
Held, that "where the driver of a motor vehicle suddenly becomes physically or mentally incapacitated without warning, he
cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from the operation of
his vehicle while he is so incapacitated, but that where a prima
facie case of negligence has been established by the plaintiff, the
burden is upon the defendant to show the sudden illness or attack,
and to further show that the illness or attack was unanticipatable
and unforeseen". As the defendant met this requirement and P
failed to rebut it, the lower court should have sustained the defendants motion for a directed verdict. Keller v. Wonn, 87 S.E.2d 453
(W. Va. 1955).
This decision follows the general rule in the United States.
See, e.g., 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles 179 (1936); Arnot., 28 A.L.R.2d
35 (1953).
G. H. W.
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